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PROBLM SOLVING AND DECISIONMAKING: AN INTEGRATION
Duncan L. Dieterly
Ames Research Center
and
Air Force Human Resources Laboratory Technology Office
SUMMARY
In this paper an attempt is made to redress a critical fault of decision-
making and problem-solving research. That fault is a lack of a standard
method to classify problem or decision states or conditions. it Basic model, is
identified and expanded to indicate a possible taxonomy of conditions which
may be used in reviewing previous research or for systematically pursuing new
research designs. A generalization of the basic conditions was made to indi-
cate that the conditions are essentially the same for both concepts, problem
solving and decisionmaking.
INTRODUCTION
Problem solving and decisionmaking are two areas of behavior that have
always intrigued behavioral scientists and the general public. The associa-
tion of these two processes with thinking and of thinking with the unknown
activity within man, accents and intensifies the intrigue. In reviewing an
extensive body of literature in both these areas two phenomena are noticed.
First, there appears to be a relationship between the two, and second, there
is not a great deal of clarity about the boundaries of either. The ease with
which a problem-solving task becomes one of decisionmaking and a decision-
making task becomes a problem-solving task can be seen repeatedly in the
literature. It would not be difficult to select a research study from both
areas and find upon comparison that the major dimensions of each study are
similar. Although different words may be used, the type of condition that is
required for a decisionmaking study or a problem-salving study is basically
the same.
Although the general condition is the same, there appears to be a con-
siderable amount of variation in the conditions addressed. Therefore, a
criticism that must be leveled at both areas of research is that there is no
standard definition for the condition studied. It would appear propitious at
this time to make more definitive statements about the condition to be
studied. If in fact the condition for each type of research is a general
one, some statement should be made; if the condition is not general, then a
statement shruld be made for each. The purpose of this paper is to develop a
general condition model that is applicable to both areas and expand that model
to allow for a taxonomy of conditions. Perhaps the present situation is a
function of historical antecedents.
Historically, the literature that covers these areas is generated about
two major approaches: (1) the initial studies on thought by the earliest
behavioral scientist who adopted a problem-solving design to study animal and
s
man initiating a vast quantity of information on problem solving, and (2) tile,
concern for improved production through better decisions emphasized in the
work of scientist in management and administration which focused on decision-
making. The two approaches which initially addressed rather narrow aspects
of a special area have expanded to the degree that a commonality across the
areas has been established. Problem-solving research has broadened from
simple trial and error problems into complex situation problems such as the
prisioner's dilemma. While decisionmaking research .jumped from single
decisionmaking tasks to major multidecision interactive situations that may
be encountered in an executive meeting. Which comes first -® decisionmaking
or problem solving? Although soma discussion is encountered on this topic,
it is not a relevant question. Larson (1962), for example, indicates that a
problem condition precedes a decision and maintains that the critical aspect
of decisionmaking is defining the problem. The relationship between the two
is what is important. The major problem of any review of these areas is the
varied scope and type of material presented. The key issue is what condition
is necessary for a decisionmaking or problem-solving task. Much of the
confusion over controversial results springs from the inability to establish
a standarc'' definition of problem solving or decisionmaking. This inability
is anchored in how the situation or condition is defined. The condition,
which must exist before a decisionmaking or problem-solving study is com-
pleted, seldom is discussed directly in detail. What is elaborated to an
adequate degree is the operational task to be accomplished, that is, series
of analogies and selection of a new director. Clarification of the under-
lying condition of the task is avoided. The basic conditions of the opera-
tional task must be delineated if systematic research is to exist. An eval-
uation of the operational task in each type of study may provide some insight
into the situation.
This report represents the work accomplished by the AFHRL Technology
Office located at NASA Ames Research Center. The effort was accomplished in
support of a NASA Project in the area of Resource Management. The material
presented was developed by the AFHRL Tech Office and provided to the Man
Vehicle Systems Research Division of the Life Sciences Directorate as a
possible source of planning for the later stages of their project.
PROBLEM SOLVING
In a problem-solving task the subject is placed into a task situation,
provided some basic material, information or equipment, and expected to solve
a "problem." The determination of whether a solution has been reached is
signaled by making a final or end response. A final response is the one the
scientist has established as correct and the one he is waiting for. An end
response is a response that the subject in some way indicates is the last to
be given in this situation. If the end response is acceptable to the scien-
tist, the problem is solved; if it is not acceptable, the subject is sent back
for more activity or told that the response was wrong. In the first case, the
problem situation is still there; in the second, the subject is finished with
that problem. Frequently, problem-solving situations have only one acceptable
solution. Historically the research has been dominated by the single-solution
zil
problem. It has only been in the past 15 years that inure complex multisolu-
tion problems have been emphasized.
DECISIONMAKING
In :he decisionmaking task the subject is placed into a task situation,
provided some basic material, information, or equipment, and expected to
reach a decision. The decision is generally measured by the arrival, at an
end response. The acceptable end response is a choice ofaction. The choice
may be "correct" or "incorrect" depending on the research design, but more
frequently it is not considered in those terms. The process by which the
subject arrives at the end response is the critical concern. Deeisionmaking
tasks initially were viewed as choices that required clarification. Once
clarified the choice was obvious. The trend toward concern with major deci-
sion situations still has this flavor but introduces a complexity that pre-
cludjps such a simplistic notion.
COMPARISON OF PROBLEM SOLVING AND DECISIONMAKING
As has been indicated ;
 there is a degree of similarity between the two
basic tasks as studies in most controlled research. The problem-solving
studies which began with animals have escalated into areas of group problem
solving and problem solving under uncertainty. The decisionmaking research
studies have always dealt at complex decision levels and are dominated by
how-to-do-it methods. Although both areas of research are seeking to study
the process, most studies shed little light on this aspect of the situation,
In spite of the emphasis on the process, there has not been a great deal of
analysis of the process. In problem-solving research, the process is dis-
cussed after the data have been collected; in decisionmaking research the
process typically is identified in some form prior to task completion.
Problem-solving research has generated far more empirical studies than deci-
sionmaking research. Problem-solving strategies and decision strategies have
been repeatedly established to train someone to make the correct response
under specific situations, but there is little or no evaluation of the tech-
niques. There are no competing techniques or studies to compare technique A.
with technique B. Neither area has been clarified to a level of sophistica-
tion that allows for the hypothesis of alternative theories. One reason for
this is the lack of specificity of what is a problem-solving or a decision-
making condition.
BASIC CONDITION
There are some commonalities between the problem-solving and decision-
making tasks. In both types of research the subject must identify and select
a method of attack. In the problem-solving task, the method must be applied
3
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to obtain the solution. in decisionmaking, the method is only identified
with the application implied. In either case, a method must be identified to
move from the problem or decision state to a choice or solution that termi-
nates the decision or problem condition. In problem solving, the appla.cation
usually has rapid feedback of results; in decisionmaking the quality of the
decision may never be assessed.
In order to effectively grasp the effect of previous research in the
areas of decisionmaking and 	 aolving, some order must be established
in terms of the operational coidi.tio -3 that ara applied. The diversity of
conditions used as operational measures of problems or decision points range
across those concerned with when to build a new plant or how a monkey can
secure a banana. A major difficulty is the lack of standardization of condi-
tions used in research studies. In addition, the requirement for the research
may be so specific that a unique set of conditionsis developed for each
study. Therefore, it is appropriate to begin with a definition and basic
model of the condition that might describe a problem or decision task.
Drawing on other research (Reitman, 1965) a decision-probl em condition is
said to exist when "A condition or state exists and another condition or
state is desired." The method of attaining the new state will be called a
transition. The basic model of a decision-problem condition is shown in
figure 1. The initial state is indicated by A and the final or end state is
indicated by B.
STATE
	 STATE
A
	
TRANSITION
	 B
Figure l.— Basic decision-problem condition.
The basic model of the decision-problem condition would apply to a
problem-solving situation as follows. In the problem situation, the initial
state may be the given information, or some subset of the information pro-
vided. For example, given the problem, "If Betty has 2 apples, 6 oranges,
and 5 bananas, and Roger has 3 apples, 3 oranges, and 5 bananas, how many
bananas do they have together?" all the information for state A is provided
and state B is indicated. The only task is to make the transition from
state A to state B. Assuming the transition is addition, then the model of
the condition is as shown in figure 2.
What is the problem? To determine how many bananas the two have together.
Five plus 5 equals 10. We can expect one of two responses from the subject:
a correct response or an incorrect response. A correct response will lead to
the assumption that the transition used was addition. An incorrect response
does not indicate as much, addition may have been used incorrectly, or some
other transition applied.
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BETTY HAS 2 APPLES	 \
6 ORANGES
5 0ANANAS	 BOTH HAVE
ROGER HAS 3 APPLESADDITION 10 BANANAS
3 ORANGES
5 BANANAS
Figure 2.— Basic model applied to the problem.
By modifying this condition in terms of the information provided, we
have a decisionmaking task. The subject is asked the following; "If Betty
has 2 apples, 6 oranges, and 5 bananas and Roger has 3 apples, 3 oranges, and
5 bananas, do they both have 10 bananas?" In order to make this decision,
the same process would be applied. The requirement to determine the number
of bananas and then compare that to a ,final state of 10 is what makes this a
decision task and not a problem-solving task. The decision task, in this
case, is more complicated because not only is addition applied, but also a
comparison is made; however, the condition still demands the initial state,
end state, and transition. Again, there is a correct and incorrect answer.
A "yes" answer implies that a valid decision process was applied and the
transition was addition. A "no" answer does not tell us as much. In either
case, we do not learn much about the process, but gain some information about
the subject's capability of solving problems or making decisions. The basic
decision-problem condition model applies to both cases.
The information provided that established the initial state and desired
end state shows that the condition is the same for both types of research. A
state exists, a transition is required, and an end state is indicated. It is
interesting to note that in neither research condition do the subjects have
an interest in the two fruit owners or in their bananas; however, they will
obediently perform the prescribed task. In laboratory research the element
of commitment is assumed and generally obtained; in field studies, commitment
may be a variable of interest which must be manipulated (Janis and Mann,
1976).
EXPANDED MODEL
This simple model provides the basic aspects of both the problem-solving
and decisionmaking conditions and represents the decision-problem condition.
As can be seen from the literature, the types of conditions that are of most
>	 g
interest are far more complex than the two given in the example. To ade-
quately model these types of conditions, the basic modal must be expanded.
If the three variables concerned are assumed to have two possible values,
known and unknown, then the basic model will consist of eight possible
variants. In the diagram of this property (fig. 3), a solid line indicates a
t	 Il	 III	 IV
r
I	 I
I	 I
INTUITIVE
	 UNDEFINED
V	 VI	 VII
	
VIII
TRIVIALDEFINED
Figure 3.— Decision-problem condition models.
known variable and a dotted line an unknown variable. The eight variations
are shown in figure 3. As can be seen, the models have been grouped into two
sets of three models and the two extremes isolated. Model VIII represents a
condition in which the initial state, transition, and end state are all
known. In a problem task the transition would be made and success or failure
would be dependent on the ability of applying the transition. In the deci-
sion task a choice would be made to apply the transition. Model VIII depicts
the final map of a successful decision-solution selection. Once the subject
reaches this point the solution or decision is established. The process that
reduces the condition to the basic model is the critical factor. Therefore,
model VIII is termed "trivial," indicating a model that once obtained Is, in
essence, the solution or decision. It is the state the problem solver or
decisionmaker is attempting to achieve to accomplish the task.
Model I represents the opposite of model `VIII in that no elements are
known. This model is termed "intuitive" because it represents a nebulous
condition of feeling or concern. This type of model is so undefined that it
cannot represent a decision-problem condition in its initial form. It should
be noted that most decision-problem conditions may begin as intuitive feel-
ings; however, it is only when they are partially defined, so that at least
one element is known, that they are considered decision-problem conditions.
Another way of viewing the set of models would be as a dynamic set of stages
within the decision-solution process. A decision-problem condition would
emerge from model I, and as it is clarified and defined it evolves into a
model with one, then two, theft three known elements until it finally solidi-
fies as a model VIII. The actual definition of the initial state, transi-
tion, and end state is usually the process of interest, especially in more
complex decision-problem conditions. It must always be remembered that
although these models may represent a reasonable approximation of how an
individual can resolve the problem or make the decision after fully clarify-
ing all three dimensions, a decision can be made or solution generated at any
point. That means that one may, without any clarification, apply a transi-
tion and achieve the end state. This may be either a case of what people
like to call "luck" or a result of a clarification process that was not
Indicated in the information gathering phase of the study,
The basic condition selected for a study largely defines the subtasks
that must be completed to terminate the condition. The process of clarifica-
tion from the condition provided to a decision or solution will not be con-
sidered in this paper. As can be seen in the models presented there are
three possible subtasks, each involving the clarification of one of the
model's dimensions. A conxli,tion that has two unknown dimensions may be more
difficult than one with one unknown. In addition, the difficulty encountered
may be dependent on which dimensions are unknown. For example, when the
initial state is unknown the resolution may be more difficult than when the
end state Is unknown.
CORRECT DECISION SOLUTION
In either problem salving or decisionmaking, the implication of correct-
ness may be a concern. In the traditional sense, a correct decision or
solution may be established or predetermined. The more complex conditions of
interest explore problems or decisions that do not necessarily have a correct
response. '.There may exist a series of correct responses but they are seldom
all inclusive. In the more realistic conditions drawn directly from actual:
operational situations the responses are only noted and not evaluated. This
lack of evaluation also explains why few prescribed decision-problem solving
methods are ever tested,
One must be aware of the "correctness phenomena," however. Whether a
correct resolution exists or not, either in the research design or by defini-
tion, the subject will expect and seek out a correct resolution. This pre-
disposition on the part of subjects is especially important if the research
is concerned with creativity. Decision-problem conditions that have an
absolute solution and those that do not would logically be treated as the
same, but there may be some basis for each requiring a different clarifica-
tion process or at least a variation of a basic clarification process. It
has even been suggested that larger decision-problem conditions may require a
special individual for each step of the process (Newman, 1963).
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INITIAL STATE
.based on the initial state, the models were grouped into two sets; those
in which state A is known, termed "defined," and those in which state A is
unknown, termed "undefined." "Ill-defined" is a term used in the literature,
but it is not necessarily associated with only undefined initial states. If
we review the two sets of models we see that in the defined set the task to
be accomplished is to discover or identify either or both of the unknown ele-
ments of the transition or end state. When this is accomplished n model VIII
(fig. 3) is attained. In the case of defined decision-problem conditions we
know where we are and that we must get somewhere else; how and where area to be
determined. Model V is the more difficult case because two unknowns must be
clarified and identified. Model VI is interesting in that it describes a con-
dition of knowing the initial state and the transition, but not the end state.
This condition lends itself to responses without further analysis. In other
words, it allows for immediate action disregarding clarity of outcome. This
model is frequently encountered in organizations that demand action. Model VII
probably reflects what is generally conceived as a problem condition. We know
the initial state and end state; what requires clarification is the transition
or method. in the decision mode, iC is selecting from a developed set; in the
problem mode, it is selecting + om a developed set and applying the method.
Interestingly, using this t.76tc type of condition the selected decision is not
necessarily tested, while in the problem mode the solution is tested.
The set of models calAed "undefined" may also have either one or two
unknowns; however, in all cases the initial state is unknown. This rendition
is usually the type meant when discussing ill-defined problems. Two models
in this set have two unknowns, so they would be more difficult to resolve than
model IV. Model IV is aeldom if ever encountered in the literature. It is a
condition that most subjects find Acceptable. It only becomes a decision-
problem condition when an evaluation is required in terms of progress.
Model II is representative of a great many decision conditions. This is a
case in which the end state is known, but the initial state and transition
are not. All too frequently this condition is resolved by defining the trans-
ition so that a modes IV is obtained and no further analysis is taken.
Model III represents a condition that exists too often. The transition is
constantly being applied but neither the initial nor end state is known and
if it is continued, there exists an open action loop with no completion phase.
Model III may represent the trial-by-error situation or a skid acquisition
task in a training context. Most ill-defined decision-problem research stems
from a model II or IV condition.
Of the eight models, only six would be used in a research design.
Model. VIII would represent the correct model, and the general task for the
subject is to clarify the unknown dimension of the condition to produce a
model VIII. As was indicated, it would be anticipated that the difficulty of
the task would be affected by the number an-' type of unknown dimensions.
^'a
COMPLEX CONDITIONS
This set of m,­;eals provides a basis for the analysis of more complex con-
diriono, for once the conditions are clarified into a model VIII form ) there
is only action to be taken. The type of action is determined by the process
that clarified the model, The models introduced so fiAr are flexible enough to
account for a large proportion of the types of conditions frequently encoun-
tered; however, there exist some decision-problem c , )ncitions that are not
covered by these models. 
An 
even more complex eta.6 or conditions is gener-
ated if the concept of multiplicity is assumed. What if there existed a set
oC conditions that had multiple Initial states, trivioltions, or end states?
Since decision-problem conditions of thin type do exist, the models must be
able to address them. The possibility of multiple initial states will be
included in the final model set but will not be discussed in detail. The
reason for this is that the conditions represent not a decision-problem condi-
tion but a more complex decision-problem sequence analysis. one aspect of
this type of condition is the selection of the condition to resolve or setting
priorities or resolving all the conditions in the sequence. By introducing
multiplicity, five classes of conditions ) each with eight variations, are
introduced. There are then 40 different variations of the basic model, Fig-
ure 4 shows the possible classes applied to model VIII.
MULTIPLE
	
MULTIPLE
	 MULTIPLE	 E114D STATES
SINGLE
	
END STATES'
	 TRANSITIONS & TRANSITIONS	 MULTIPLE
I
	 11	 III	 IV	 V
Figure 4.— Classes of conditions across model V111.
Vie class variations are presented for model VIII for clarity, All five
class variations of model VIII represent the final or end modal that would be
obtained after a decision-problem process had been completed. They are the
culmination of the process in which all elements have been clarified. It,
class Ii nwdels, the introduction of multiple end states may be a model of
what is called "decision under uncertainty." This is because one transition
may lead to two or more end states, It is conceivable that a situation might
occur in which only one transition but several end states are identified with-
out any way of knowing which will be attained. Presumably any of the end
states would be acceptable.
In the class III set, the initial and Ind states are known, but there are
two or more transitions that will attain the end state, in class IV, the com-
plax condition occurs inwhich several transitions may result i.n several end
states, (tote that each transition may end in each end state,) Finally,
class V conditions occur in which two or more end states may result from two
or more transitions starting with two or more initial states. These models
are appropriate when the process of interest is that of multiple decision-.
problem analysis; this latter process is not within the scope of this paper..
In expanding the classes across 8 models, 40 possible models are gener-
ated. A complete set of the models is provided in figure 5. This act of
models represents an extreme -ari.ety of decision-problem conditions by only
assuming three dimensions with two possible charactexisties. What has been
provided is possible basic taxonomy or decision-problem conditions that are
found and could be used in problem solving or decisionmaking research. The
more simple problems used in animal and child studies are the class I
models V-VII; the types of conditions used in studies of complex decision
tasks are of the class IV model. II-IV varieties.
Theapplication of this taxonomy to the types of conditions used in past
research may require a degree of content analysis, but allows for a method to
review research that will contribute more substantial conclusions than if more
liberal terminology is used to selectand group the available research. In
producing a decision-problem research dcsign the use of this type of taxonomy
allows for an improved operational definitionand insures a more refined
statement of the results. It is only through the adoption of this type of
scheme that decision-problem conditions can be studied wita some degree of
control.. Synthetic decision--problem conditions can be developed around these
models so that the results from several studies can be compared with more
confidence. Ktthads can be developed to allow for the training of the subject
to transform the decision-problem condition into a model VIII type and there-
fore arrive at the dccision-solution. The making of a decision-solution is a
matter of choice or application when all aspects of the decision-problem con-
dition are clarified. The clarification of the decision-problen, condition is
the important process. In problem solving and decisi.onmaki.ng the task require-
ments are slightly different, but the conditions are the same and the clari-
fication process may be the same. The reason for one condition being labeled
"solved" and another "decided" is a function of the demand characteristic,
not of the condition or of the clarification process.
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DECISION-PROBLEM PROCESS
Explanations of the decisionmaking processes and problem-solving pro-
cesses are fairly abundant. They may be called techniques or methods, but if
they are analyzed they have a fairly consistent set of properties. Because
there exists no contrary evidence that would lead one to assume that these
techniques are incorrect, a general model of the process is assumed. The
model should be accepted and tested, not just applied. Alternative models,
which may be more effective, should also be generated. The model will be
called the clarifying-process model rather than decisionmaking or problem-
solving model. Therefore, the implication is that the process necessary to
solve a problem or make a decision is the same. The model consists of five
stages: (1) identifying the situation, (2) determining options, (3) establish-
ing outcomes, and (4) manipulating, evaluating, and analyzing information.
Identifying the situation is a clarification of the initial state. This
consists of determining the initial state of either the problem or decision.
In determining the choices, a clarification of the transition is made. For a
problem condition, we evaluate the possible transitions; for a decision condi-
tion, the possible choices are evaluated. It should be noted that in either
case some type of action is implied; this is necessary for computing the
11
solution or implementing the choice. In establishing the ouLeomeo, we ► ro,
Litt! end	 three.dimensions, infor-Uarlfytog, i	 states. in order to clar -Lfy these thre .
ma(ion manipulation takes place. ThIti coonints k► f tile, reviewing and ordering
of the available Information and synhesis or MlluaLioll strategies. IV.. MIRY
also illolude the procurement of new information to be interpreted and into-
grated with the avallable itif ortim Lion. 11,ased oil the Informatiou, acquisition
and, evaluation, sore Selection rule or rules art,- established. The noleeLiou
rule is a critical aspect of this process and refleas erfteria used to weigh
po8sible transitions and end states or, tiloro formally, a mathematical model to
be applied that will provide it resultant produot. The 8eleotion rule may be
complex or arbitrary, but in any eVC11t It IS applied. VIT-(111011tly, SCICQUOU
rule approximations are applied that vedLICA' the set of transitions but still
do not identify the optimum one, Nee the ,ie^].ection rule is established the
data are ordered and the rule applied identifying the solution or decision.
Therefore, a decision is made or a solution established. After the choice 1.9
made there is associated a mode, of action, a c ojjjp:).L^ tion point and , in expected, 
outcome, The mode of action is the implementation of the selected transition
and Lhe completion point is attained when the transition Is eompleLed. The
expoeted outcome. is the 
end 
state.
III this type of resoarch, we generally imake the mistake of ignoritut the
.gubject's capability. In deeislon-problem condiLions Ja which high it, 1 o f
information are either provided or are available, the subjects anpabilir, to
synthesize is of great importance. As the amount of information decreases,
the Subject's knowledge or Itif orma Lion store becomes dominant; that Is, the
sob jest has only previous experience to draw upon to address the tosk. As the
information decreases below I certain degree, only orudo vsLliftltos viy be
made; therefore, the task may degenerate into that of risk taking or of making
Choices under risky C'Ond-Itions. In field studies this oiLuation genorally
occurs clue to U1110 or external Constraints; that i's, the Lnsk III-ost be Complotod
by at spoelfted timo. Tho more 001111)ILIX the Coll(Ilt-LO11, tho mart) varInble the
vffoet of individual difforenoos on the rosul-Us.
The entire process zissm"OS completa information nvailabilit y , .1  complotely
valid selection rule, and no external intervention or Change through time,
Each of these assumptions is normally violated 011CL I, Lite cl ► rifivaLiout process
IS removed from the control of a laboratory study. 'Thurt` are three reason.,;
for the unavailability of information: it may be nonexistent, there may be
resource constraints, or it may be unknown. The rasource eonsLvaint is most
often time, but is cant 	 manpower, teelmology, or funding, A valid selection
'
 %, 'Le 111L	 I), I.	 Nails the Selection of appropriate de(Usion, variables which tire 	 oa^ s
Information dependent. The quality (if the information way therefore weaken
the selection rule. External. intervention may occur !,it many ways, but it
represents an activity that was not considered 
in the clarification process,
MULTIDIMENSIONAL DECISION-PIWIMEH ASPECTS
In most laboratory or field studies a set of experimental decision•problem
conditions is presented and dealt with independently. Many research efforts
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are concerned with the requirements to handle a set of decisions-solutions
.1 -aring a total period of time or with working at a series of decision-problem
conditions that are related. If this it, the case, the introducing of a dimen-
sion of sequencing and the addition of 11 task of assigning priority to each
decision-problem condition must be considered. This is especially true when
some degree of stress is introduced Into the study, forcing rapid responses
over fixed time, periods.
Another dimension that may be of importance is that of multiperson
groups or teams. If a group of persons is involved, then the personal inter-
action may be important or the experience of each person may be critical. In
addition, the dimension of responsibility would become important if the set
of decision-problem conditions was to be allocated to different persons'.
This would also require an integration iianagement system to Complete the
series. The level of complexity introduced by these dimensions approximates
the environment of most field deals io n- problem studies. The models presented
provide a foundation for these types of sLud 4. ,­.s but the other variables or
dimensions would have to be measured. If a systematic application of the
conditions provided is to be successful, then the addition of more dimensions
must be gradual. Although many studies have been completed that address a
considerable number of additional dimensions, it is hard to equate the
results to any pattern or direction. The adaptation of the basic set of
models as these to be used brings to rear the advantage of standardized
conditions which will allow for more rapid advancement in knowledge about the
clarification process.
CONCLUSION
In this paper an attempt was made to redress a critical fault of
decisionmaking and problem-solving research. That fault was a lack of
decision-problem condition standardization. A basic model was identified and
expanded upon to indicate a possible taxonomy of conditions that may be used
in reviewing previous research  or for systematically pursuing new research.
A gent-1ralizacion of the basic conditions was made to indicate that the condi-
tions are the same for both types of research. A general model of the pro-
cess, referred to as a clarification process, was discussed; it may well be
appropriate for both types of research. if this is the case, the 'results Of
both areas should be renewed to gain insight into this process. Future
research should avoid the superficial issue of d ecisionma Icing or problem
solving and concentrate upon the process.
The problems of individual differences, multidecision-problem sets and
111L►ltiperson teams were briefly discussed as an indication of the complexity
of the task of accomplishing research in these areas. It will only be when
we are prepared to be more rigorous in research designs that a better under-
standing of the decisionmaking and problem-solving process will be attained.
The large body of information reflecting studies in these areas stands as a
silent reminder of the importance of these areas. It is now time to address
the areas of decisionmaking and problem solving with more determination and
scientific acumen.
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